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The Police Power and the Regulation of 
Medical Practice: A Historical Review and 
Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation 
of Physicians in BRISA-Qualified 
Managed Care Organizations 
Edward P. Richards* 
INTRODUCTION 
The central health care regulatory issue facing the states is 
how to enforce a consistent regulatory environment over both 
BRISA-qualified managed care organizations ("MCOs") and 
those that are not covered by ERISA's limitations on state regu­
lation. More generally, states are confronting substantial 
changes in the medical care delivery system, changes that are 
driven by private corporations and that are sometimes in con­
flict with state policy. These changes demand the quicker regu­
latory responses that are possible when decision making is 
delegated to an agency, rather than being expressed only 
through the legislature. The states, through their police power, 
have broad latitude to regulate the practice of medicine. Con­
gress has provided few limitations on this power, and the United 
States Supreme Court has only limited it w hen it directly con­
flicts with certain limited constitutional rights of patients.1 In 
almost all cases where the extent of police power has been at 
issue, the state and federal courts have found in favor of the 
state. Unfortunately, state medical licensing boards have not 
used these powers to exercise meaningful oversight of medical 
practice and MCOs and are thus ill-prepared to meet the chal-
* Edward P. Richards, III, J.D., M.P.H., is Professor of Law and Adjunct Profes­
sor of Business at the University of Missouri Kansas City. He received his undergrad­
uate training at Rice University, post-graduate training at Baylor College of Medicine 
and the University of Michigan, his Juris Doctor from the University of Houston, and 
his Masters in Public Health from the University of Texas School of Public Health. 
His website is: http://plague.law.umkc.edu. 
1. The Supreme Court has indicated that there would be constitutional issues if 
the state regulatory body acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or otherwise violated gen­
erally applicable constitutional or federal g uidelines applicable to all state actions. 
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lenge of regulating the practice of medicine in a managed care 
environment. 2 
Regulation of medical practice through state licensing la�s is 
a common pathway to control the medical aspects o! patient 
care delivered by MCOs because every aspect of patient care 
depends on physician decision �aking .. If the MC<? d'?es not 
allow physicians to practice consistent �1th state la�, it will h�ve 
no physicians and thus cannot function, yet this regulation 
should not run afoul of BRISA. The thesis of this article is de­
veloped in two parts: (1) a detailed revi�w of the J?Olice po�er 
and the court's construction of it in relation to medical practice; 
and (2) an analysis of the role of physi�ians in MCOs a�d how 
this role can be controlled by state pohce power regulation. 
I. THE POLICE POWER AND THE REGULATION OF 
MEDICAL PRACrICE 
A. The Colonial and Early Constitutional Period 
Since colonial times, the regulation of professions has been 
seen as a state activity in the United States. Medicine is a partic­
ular creature of state regulation because it is the nexus of th ree 
traditional areas of police power regulation. First, it is a profes­
sion like law, and as such, was subject to state regulation. Sec­
ond, medical practitioners posed peculiar risks to the public 
health and safety that other professions such as law did not 
pose. Third, and most important historically, physicians have 
been closely involved in the state public health regulations as 
they applied to epidemic disease and sanitation. In this role, 
physicians acted both as private volunteers and as public health 
2. "Our data on the response of the Board to complaints also raises questions as 
to the ability of medical licensure boards to address problems concerning the clinical 
competence of their licensees (and thus ultimately the problem of medical error) 
through disciplinary interventions. It is often assumed that the primary function of 
licensure boards is t o  assure clinical competence, and that the volume of their formal 
disciplinary actions is  an appropriate measure for evaluating their success in accom­
plishing this task. Our study demonstrates that evaluating board success solely on the 
basis o� formal disciplinary .actions is inadequate because boards may be more active at the mformal level than is commonly supposed. Indeed, given the resource con­
straints generally faced by licensure boards, and the substantial commitment of re­
sources required when formal action is taken, it may be that informal action is not just 
an alter�ative to form�l disciplinary action, but a more rational strategy for boards to 
pursue m some cases. See Timothy S. Jost, et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Pro­
fessional Discipline: A Look At Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX, 309, 
335-36 (1993). See also the related article, Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of 
Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 825 (1995). 
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officers, this generally being a part-time and unpaid office but 
one that allowed the physician to exercise the state's police pow­
ers to abate local threats to the public health, including imposing 
quarantine. 
1. Epidemic Disease and the Police Power 
Disease control and nuisance abatement were a primary focus 
in the colonial governments. The authority for these actions was 
described in Blackstone3 and was assumed to have belonged to 
the state from time immemorial. While it is little noted in con­
stitutional theory, the natural history of disease in the colonies 
did much to shape the ultimate distribution of powers between 
the states and the federal government.4 Most of the population 
centers in the colonies were near or on rivers or bays because 
water was the prime way to move goods within the colonies and 
between the colonies and England. This meant that they were 
subject to mosquito depredations for all of the year in the south­
ern colonies and in the summer in the northern colonies. Mala­
ria, caused by a protozoa spread by mosquitoes, was endemic in 
the colonies. Malaria is a chronic illness that causes great mor­
bidity and substantial mortality, but kills slowly and does not 
manifest as fast-moving epidemics. As it still does in much of 
3. "The fourth species of offenses, more especially affecting the commonwealth, 
are such as are against the public health of the nation; a concern of the highest impor­
tance, and for the preservation of which there are in many countries special magis­
trates or curators appointed . . . .  The first o f  these offenses is a felony, but by the 
blessing of Providence for more than a century past, incapable of being committed in 
this nation. For by statute I Jae. I c. 31 . .. it is enacted, that if any person infected 
with the plague, or dwelling in any infected house, be commanded by the mayor or 
constable or other head officer of his town or vill to keep his house, and shall venture 
to disobey it h e  may be enforced . . .  to obey such necessary command and, if any hurt 
ensue by such enforcement, the watchmen are thereby indemnified. And further, if 
such person so commanded to confine himself goes abroad, and converses in com­
pany, if he has no plague sore upon him, h e  shall be punished as a vagabond by 
whipping, and be bound to his good behavior; but if he has any infectious sore upon 
him uncured, he then shall be guilty of felony. By the statute 26 George. II, c. 6 . . .  
the method of performing quarantine, or forty days probation, by ships coming from 
infected countries, is put in a much more regular and effectual order than formerly, 
and masters of ships, coming from infected places and disobeying the directions there 
given, or having the plague on board and concealing it, are guilty o f  felony without 
benefit of clergy. The same penalty also attends persons escaping from the lazarets, or 
places wherein quarantine is to be performed, and officers and watchmen neglecting 
their duty, and persons conveying goods or letters from ships performing quarantine. " 
See 4 WILLIAM. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 161.  
4. This is ironic given that it was largely the effects of communicable diseases that 
allowed the Europeans to quickly subdue the indigenous populations and colonize the 
Americas. See WILLIAM. H. McNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 160-65 (1976). 
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the developing world, malaria provides a constant background 
of illness. 
The colonies were also subject to yellow fever, a viral disease 
also spread by mosquitos. Yellow fever is a rapidly progressive 
disease that makes the victim extremely sick within a week or so 
after exposure to an infected mosquito. Yello� fever in urban 
areas is carried from infected persons to the umnf ected by mos­
quito bites. As more people become infected, there is a greater 
chance that a mosquito will be carrying the disease. This means 
that yellow fever tended to develop from a few cases into mas­
sive epidemics very rapidly. Patients who survive the first week 
of the infection usually have a p rolonged convalescence but re­
cover fully. Many victims die from the primary effect of the dis­
ease. Even those who might have otherwise recovered, died 
during epidemics in the colonies because there was no one to 
nurse them due to the number of people who were ill at one 
time.5 The impact on the colonies of the 1798 epidemic was de­
scribed in counsel's argument before the United States Supreme 
Court in one of the key police p ower cases: 
For ten years prior, the yellow-fever had raged almost annu­
ally in the city, and annual laws were passed to resist it. The 
wit of man was exhausted, but in vain. Never did the pes­
tilence rage more violently than in the summer of 1798. The 
State was in despair. The rising hopes of the metropolis began 
to fade. The opinion was gainin g  ground, that the cause of this 
annual disease was indigenous, and that all precautions against 
its importation were useless. But the leading spirits of that day 
were unwilling to give up the city without a final desperate 
effort. The havoc in the summer of 1798 is represented as ter­
rific. The whole country was roused. A cordon sanitaire was 
thrown around the city. Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania 
proclaimed a non-intercourse bet ween New York and 
Philadelphia. 6 
5. Ten percent of the population of Philadelphia died of yellow fever between 
September and November, 1793. J. H. POWELL, BRING OUT YouR DEAD at page xiv 
(1949). 
' 
6 . . Smith v. �ner, 48 U.�. �83,_340-41, 7 How. 283 (1849). (This is an important case �n the e_vo�ution of the d1st�ction between permissible police power regulations 
and 1mperrmss1?Ie state regulation of commerce. Smith is actually a pair of cases 
argued and decided together as the "License Cases." Boston and New York had es· 
tablished sta
.
te �ublic _health hospitals whose duties included determining if ship pas­sengers la�dmg m their ports were infected with communicable diseases. To fund this, 
the. states i�i:osed a h�a� tax on persons landing at their ports. These were attacked as 1mperm1ss1ble restnct1ons on interstate commerce and foreign trade. In their de­fense, the states argued that this was analogous to the closing of state borders that had 
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Yellow fever had raged through the colonies since the earliest 
period, always in the late summer and fall when the mosquito 
populations were highest.7 The epidemic decimated Philadel­
phia in the summer and fall of 1793, killing in excess of 5,000 out 
of a population of about 55,000. The combined effect of yellow 
fever, malaria, typhus,8 water-borne diseases such as typhoid, 
and other communicable diseases, was a life expectancy in the 
cities of about twenty-five years.9 Fear of communicable disease 
permeated society, affecting legislators, judges, and the drafters 
of the Constitution. The result was twofold: first, it was recog­
nized that the government, under the old doctrine of societal 
self-defense, had plenary power to impose restrictions on prop­
erty and persons to prevent to spread of disease;10 and second, 
that this power belonged to the states,11 subject to concurrent 
congressional regulation for national purposes.12 Despite the 
been allowed during the epidemics. The court rejected this, finding that border clos­
ing was a direct public health measure related to the threat of disease, while the tax 
was only a way of funding this protection. Such tax acted as an unconstitutional re­
straint on trade because it interfered with interstate commerce and invaded the fed­
eral government's exclusive right to regulate foreign commerce.) See also Compagnie 
Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 
(1902). 
7. The colonists saw it as cyclic, increasing in severity in some years and falling off 
in others. What they did not know was the reason for the cycles, that the disease 
would have followed both weather, because of the mosquitos, and also the number of 
cases imported into the region from trading partners such as the West Indies, where 
the disease was endemic and which were close enough to allow infected persons to 
reach the colonies before they either died or recovered and were no longer infectious. 
8. HANS ZINSSER, RATS, LICE AND HISTORY 129 (1963). 
9. LEMUEL, SHATIUCK REPORT OF THE SANITARY COMMISSION OF MASSACHU­
SETIS 1850. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). (Facsimile Edition). 
10. Edward P. Richards, The Ju rispr udence of Prevention: The Right of Societal 
Self-Defense Agai nst Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 329, 391 
(1989). 
11. "The acts of Congress, passed in 1796 and 1799, empowering and directing the 
officers of the general government to c onform to, and assist in the execution of the 
quarantine and health laws of a State, proceed, it is said, upon the idea that these laws 
are constitutional. It is undoubtedly true, that they do proceed upon that idea; and 
the constitutionality of such laws has never, so far as we are informed, been denied. 
But they do not imply an acknowledgment that a State may rightfully regulate com­
merce with foreign nations, or among the States; for they do not imply that such laws 
are an exercise of that power, or enacted with a view to it. On the contrary, they are 
treated as quarantine and health laws, are so denominated in the acts of Congress, 
and are considered as flowing from the acknowledged power of a State, to provide for 
the health of its citizens." See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 205 (1824). 
12. "No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and, con­
sequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the legislative power of the 
Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the power is 
expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is 
expressly given." See Gibbons v. Ogden, 2 2  U.S. 1, 203-4 (1824). 
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enormous expansion of individual rights jurisprudence since the 
early constitutional period, the Unit�d States Sup�eme Court 
has not substantially limited the pohce power as it relates to 
public health disease control. It most ��cen�ly affirmed the va­
lidity of these cases in the 1997 dec1s1on m Kansas v. Hen­
dricks,13 which explicitly relied on Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 14 a 
1905 smallpox immunization case. 
2. Regulation of Physicians in the Colonial Period 
During the colonial and early constitutional period, there was 
very limited regulation of the professions. With some limited 
exceptions,15 formal regulation of the professions is a post-Civil 
War phenomenon. Those regulations that had been passed by 
state legislatures were repealed in the period from the early 
1800s to the Civil War because of Jacksonian democratic notions 
of "every man his own doctor" (and lawyer), combined with the 
poor organization of the professions. Most studies of profes­
sional licensing do not attempt to differentiate between 
medicine and law during this period, assuming that similar treat­
ment by state legislatures implied similar reasons for the treat­
ment. While it is difficult to sort out cause and effect for events 
that occurred two hundred years ago, medicine was very differ­
ent in 1790 than it is today, or than it was in 1910. 
Medicine in 1790 did not work. There were a few effective 
drugs, mostly known from medieval times, but these could be 
applied as usefully by herbalists or other non-physician healers. 
Mainstream medical treatment consisted of purges, bleeding, 
and other regimes whose overall effect was to weaken the pa­
tient and increase the probability of death. More dangerously, 
since the germ theory and antisepsis had not been discovered, 
physicians did not practice good sanitation. When a physician 
made his rounds of patients, he became a very effective vector 
for communicable diseases, assuring that his entire practice had 
the benefit of whatever diseases were current at the moment. 
From a 1790s frame of reference, medicine worked as it was sup­
posed to work - it might do some good, but it was unlikely to 
prevent death. It might work in minor cases, but people tended 
to get well in minor cases anyway. There was no shortage of 
13. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
14. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
15. See PAUL STARR, TuE SocIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 44 
(Basic Books). 
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physicians, mostly untrained and self-proclaimed. In the minds 
of the populace and the legislatures, there was no justification 
for setting some physicians up with a state-enforced monopoly 
through licensing them, and excluding other physicians. Had 
medicine worked, having a good physician as opposed to a 
quack would have made a significant difference in survival that 
could have influenced the marketplace to support regulation 
and licensing. It is tempting to speculate on whether this would 
have encouraged state regulation of physicians to begin during 
the colonial period.16 
The low esteem of medicine as a profession did not mean that 
individual physicians were not respected and influential. Dr. 
Benjamin Rush is a useful archetype for understanding the soci­
etal role of the physician in this pre-regulation period. Dr. Rush 
was a noted patriot and a signer of the Declaration of Indepen­
dence. He treated many wealthy and prominent citizens. His 
reputation and respect were based on his personal behavior 
rather than his status as a physician.17 This was most evident 
during the yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia in 1793. At the 
height of the epidemic, the city was near chaos because of fear 
of the disease itself and because of the epidemic's interference 
with basic civic services and commerce.18 Dr. Rush was instru­
mental in controlling the hysteria and preserving public order.19 
16. This may not have been enough, however. See generally id. for a discussion of 
whether modern medical science, transported to early 1800s America, would have 
been significantly affected by the political response to the profession. 
17. As argued by Milton Friedman, this is the ideal position because status and 
credibility are determined by personal actions and not by state fiat through the licens­
ing process. See Michael H. LeRoy, et al., The Law And Economics Of Collective 
Bargaining For Hospitals: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis Of Bargaining Unit 
Determinations, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1992) (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM 
AND FREEDOM 149-60 (paperback ed. 1962). This is a very thoughtful article arguing 
that the courts have been much too willing to enforce restrictions on professional 
licenses. 
18. Community infrastructure is critical to preventing deaths in epidemics. For 
example, when measles was introduced into the indigenous populations in the Ameri­
cas, all members of the tribe would become ill at the same time because none of them 
had resistance from previous infection. Measles in individual cases that are properly 
nursed does not have a high fatality rate. However, when everyone is sick, no one can 
gather food or g o  for water, or provide for warmth if it is in the winter. Dehydration, 
starvation, and cold will dramatically increase the lethality of any serious illness. Co­
lonial cities, even ones large for the time, were subject to the same forces. They did 
not have extensive food stores, water had t o  be carried in most homes and waste 
disposed of by hand. All commerce was very labor intensive. If the la�o� force be­
came frightened by either disease or social disorder and fled, the remammg towns­
people would be isolated and unable to care for themselves. 
19. See Powell, supra note 5. 
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In retrospect, and even in the eyes of some of his contemporar­
ies, the treatments provided by Dr. Rush clearl� haste�ed man_
y 
to the grave, some of whom might have survived �1tho�t h�s 
ministrations. Yet his courage in the face of the ep1dem1c. his 
willingness to go to the homes of th� sic� of all social classes. 
and his unshakable belief that the ep1dem1c would pass, helped 
preserve public order and thus the provision of basic services. 
which clearly did save many lives and improve the lot of the 
afflicted and the healthy alike.20 
Physicians such as Dr. Rush, who had great personal 
_
credibil­
ity, were deeply involved in colonial affairs and were relied upon 
to help guide the state's exercise of its police powers with regard 
to public health and safety. The state itself valued medical 
knowledge, as was evident in the draconian measures that were 
taken to stem epidemics. For example, one of Paul Revere's 
children was infected during the smallpox epidemic of 1764. 
Under the public health ordinances, she would have had to be 
moved to the pesthouse, or the entire family would be quaran­
tined. Out of concern for her well-being, Revere refused to al­
low her to be taken to the pesthouse.21 He and his family were 
confined in their house for the duration of the infection. During 
this period (over a month), a quarantine flag was hung in front 
of the house and a guard was posted to keep the Reveres in and 
others away from the house.22 That prominent citizens would 
submit to these restrictions is proof of their respect for medical 
opinion. These two factors - respect for individual physicians, 
and respect for "proven" medical knowledge - prepared the 
state for later licensing efforts. 
B. The Shift to Regulation 
In the post-Civil War period the states began to license physi­
cians and institute regulations on the practice of medicine. 
20. Doctor Rush was certainly not the only hero of the epidemic. The selflessness 
�f Stephei:i Girard, the mayor at the time, was captured in case involving the disposi­
tion of this estate: "During his life he exhibited his philanthropy at a perilous mo­
ment. When the yellow fever burst upon Philadelphia in 1794, almost every one fled, 
regardless of his property. Girard walked the wards of hospitals, not subdued by the 
groans of the dymg or deterred by the fear of death to himself. All that he had was 
freely �iven to alleviate the wretched sufferers. More charitable even than the good 
Samant�n, he had not only poured oil upon their wounds, but stood by them to the 
last." Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127 (1844). 
21. See Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387, 388 (S.C. 1909) (pesthouse described as 
"coarse and comfortless ... adjoin[ing] the city dumping grounds"). 
22. ESTHER FORBES, PAUL REVERE AND THE WORLD HE LIVED IN 76-77 (1942). 
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Though a detailed discussion of the politics behind this shift 
from caveat emptor to state regulation is beyond the scope of 
this article, 23 there were several interrelated factors behind the 
change in legislative attitudes to physician licensing. 
1. Advances in Medical Science 
In hindsight, the most important development during this pe­
riod was the triumph of medical science. Medicine in 1800 was 
not significantly different from medicine in Hippocrates' time. 
The theories had shifted and some of the remedies were differ­
ent, but the underlying philosophy was still not scientific. By 
1880, the foundation had been laid for modern medical science. 
More importantly, medical science had advanced to the point 
where medical treatments started to work and physicians be­
came less dangerous to their patients. Jenner's discovery of the 
relationship of immunity to cowpox and smallpox prevention 
had been known at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but 
it was nearly fifty years later before the next significant discov­
eries. The first was anesthesia, discovered by Morton in 1846. 
This was a critical development because surgeries without anes­
thesia had to be brief and brutal, lest the patient die of shock 
from the pain and blood loss. This limited the types of proce­
dures that could be carried out, and made it difficult to prevent 
complications such as internal bleeding from inadequately 
closed arteries and veins. 
The second was the discovery that keeping wounds, surgical 
instruments, and physicians clean would dramatically reduce 
deaths due to infection. This was crucial to effective surgery. 
Although anesthesia improved surgical technique, most patients 
still died from post-operative infection. The pioneering work 
was done by Ignaz Semmelweis on childbed fever. He published 
his first findings in 1849, but was ridiculed as a fraud for attack­
ing established medical practices. He published a book on anti­
sepsis in  1861, then lapsed into madness and lived out his 
remaining few years in an asylum. His findings were taken up 
by Joseph Lister and formed the basis for a revolution in surgi­
cal practice starting in the late 1860s. Work by Pasteur during 
this time, and, later by Koch, elaborated the modern germ the­
ory. Anesthesia and antisepsis, combined with the realization 
that germs formed the general mechanism of spread for infec­
tions diseases, shifted medicine from an enterprise that gener-
23. See Starr, supra note 15. 
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ally reduced the patient's chance of survival to one that could 
offer dramatically effective cures. 
2. Public Policy and Professionalism 
Tue modern debate on the regulation of the professions has 
tended to focus on the benefits to the profession of  being regu­
lated, and the dynamic of the regulators being captured by the 
regulated industry. This is a valid issue in medical licensing: 
physicians h ave benefited greatly from licensing; and they have 
certainly captured the licensing process, to the detriment of the 
public and, as will be discussed, themselves . These issu�s arise 
as licensing systems mature and become entrenched. Different 
factors operate in the initial development of a licensing system. 
This is especially true of medicine. Medicine is such a large and 
powerful industry today that it is very difficult t o  step back to 
the 1860s, when there were no powerful medical organizations 
and little public support for medical professionalism. During 
this period, legislators were concerned with improving the qual­
ity of medical care, assuring fair pricing for medica l  services, and 
achieving other societal goals, such as effective control of com­
municable diseases.24 
Once medical science began to offer effective treatments, it 
was in the interest of the public for physicians to be educated in 
these treatments and the underlying medical science. Such 
training would be time consuming and expensive, both for the 
physician and for the state, if it was done in public facilities. Ec­
onomically, it only made sense for the physicia n  to undertake 
such training if it would improve the physician's income to a 
point where educational debts could be paid and the lost reve­
nue while in training amortized. If the entry cost into the pro­
fession were too low, and there were not effective ways to 
differentiate the trained physician from the quack, then medical 
training was not economically viable.25 Even if an occasional in­
dividual of independent means was willing to pay for the train-
�4. Ironically, this is a fair statement of current legislative interests, although the 
l�g1slatures are only beginning to appreciate the resurgence of communicable 
diseases. 
25. Timing. complicated the market differentiation problem. Forty years later, whe� t�e pubhc g�nerally accepted the importance of educated physicians, the eco­
no�1� mvestment i� training would have been worthwhile even without licensing re­stnchons on entry mto the profession. The problem was that thi s  depended on the development of credible medical education, which was dependent on the indirect sub­sidy of license restrictions. 
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ing, this was not enough to made rigorous medical schools 
viable. Licensing based on education added this economic value 
to the education, making the development of medical schools 
possible. 
Fair pricing and quality of care are inseparable because fair 
pricing deals both with the valuation of proper services and the 
prevention of fraud by charging for improper or ineffective serv­
ices. While states did attempt to regulate physician's fees, most 
of the regulatory effects were directed at limiting the ability of 
unorthodox practitioners to charge for ineffective and danger­
ous treatments. This was done through direct prohibition of 
specific practices and through a circular process of defining the 
scope of licensure. State medical licensing laws avoid defining 
allowable medical practice in terms of specific procedures or 
methods of practice. Instead, the practice of medicine is defined 
in terms of the diagnosis and treatment of illness in the manner 
used by physicians who meet the training requirements for licen­
sure. This effectively delegates the definition of appropriate 
medical practice to medical schools, residency programs, and 
their private accreditation agencies. Things that physicians do 
to diagnose and treat illness are limited to licensed physicians, 
unless they are permitted by state law to other licensed person­
nel such as chiropractors. As will be discussed later, the state 
has plenary power to define medical care and to determine the 
licensing requirements for providing that care. 
Medical licensing serves other governmental interests that are 
more tangentially related to quality of individual patient care. 
Though neglected by medical licensing boards because of their 
domination by physicians, an important function of licensing 
should be to assure that physicians fulfill their role in the public 
health system. Individual physicians see most of the cases of 
communicable diseases treated in the community. These physi­
cians must comply with disease control reporting laws and must 
assist in the investigation of disease outbreaks. They should also 
be the primary vehicle for assuring universal immunizations for 
immunization-preventable diseases. Unfortunately, state licens­
ing boards have not used their power to assure that these func­
tions are adequately carried out. A more complicated issue is 
the use of medical licensing to enforce political, as opposed to 
scientific, decisions about what constitutes proper medical care. 
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The classic examples are abortion laws and. 
narcotics laws.26 
These are discussed separately because they illustrate the o.nly 
important restrictions on the police power to regulate medical 
practice. 
3. Constitutionality of Initial Licensing Laws 
When states began to pass licensing laws they ha� to dec.
ide 
what to do about the physicians who were already m practice. 
This issue is common to all new regulations. When the group 
being regulated is large, important to society, and P?Werf�l, it is 
politically impossible to use new regulatory law to disqualify any 
substantial fraction of the existing industry.27 Each state 
reached its own mix of prospective licensure requirements and 
retroactive qualifications that persons a lready practicing 
medicine had to meet. Disqualified practitioners attacked these 
laws as being unconstitutional ex post facto l aws, as taking their 
property without due process and compensation, and as denying 
them equal protection. 
a. Ex Post Facto Laws 
The first issue raised when a state passes a new law prohibit­
ing conduct that had previously been unregulated is whether it is 
an ex post facto law. The Constitution provides, "No Bill of At­
tainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. "28 The reach of 
this provision was quickly challenged after the adoption of the 
Constitution and was reviewed by the United States Supreme 
Court in the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull.29 Justice Chase found 
that: 
:ne prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concern­
ing, and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and 
26. The federal and state laws grossly misuse the term n arcotic to refer to almost 
any 
.
P�annac�uti�al that is regulated because of its neurophannacologic effect. The 
tra�1t10nal scientific usage was limited to compounds that were derived from the 
opium poppy, most commonly morphine, heroin, and codeine. This was then ex­
tended to synthetic compounds based on the morphine structure or affecting the same 
receptors, such as fentanyl. 
27 · In a more mode� medical context, Congress passed the Medical Device 
Amendmen�s of 19?6 to give 
_
the FDA the power to assure the safety and effective­
�ess o f  me�1cal de�ces: Despite the legislative history showing grave safety problems m the medical devices
. 
mdustry, the law both grandfathered in most existing devices, 
and
. 
allowed new
. 
devices to enter the market with little FDA review if they were 
equivalent to devices on the market in 1976. See Medtronic Inc v Lohr 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996). , . . , 
28. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 9, cl. 3. (emphasis added). 
29. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
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intention of the prohibition is this; that the Legislatures of the 
several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a sub­
ject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall 
punish him for having done it. The prohibition considered in 
this light, is  an additional bulwark in favour of the personal 
security of the subject, to protect his person from punishment 
by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do not 
think it was inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights, 
of either property, or contracts.30 
Licensing laws do contain provisions to punish the unauthor­
ized practice of medicine. These are not retrospective, however, 
but only punish practices that occur after the effective date of 
the licensing law. Thus, they would not seem to implicate the 
Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws as construed by 
Justice Chase. The issue did not reach the United States 
Supreme Court with regard to medical licensing until 1898, 
when the Court decided Hawker v. People of New York.31 In 
1878, Hawker was convicted of p erforming an abortion and was 
sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary. After completing his 
sentence, he resumed the practice of medicine in New York. In 
1893, New York passed a law making it a crime to practice 
medicine after being convicted of a felony.32 Hawker continued 
to practice medicine and was indicted and convicted and or­
dered to pay a fine. Since this was clearly a criminal statute, it 
met the first prong of Justice Chase's test for an ex post facto 
law. Defendant argued that it met the second prong as well by 
increasing the punishment for a crime after he had committed 
the crime and been punished for it. The United States Supreme 
Court disagreed, finding that assuring the good character of 
physicians was within the state's police power: 
No precise limits have been placed upon the police power of a 
state, and yet it is clear that legislation which simply defines 
the qualifications of one who attempts to practice medicine is 
a proper exercise of that power. Care for the public health is 
something confessedly belonging to the domain of that power. 
The physician is one whose relations to life and health are of 
30. Id. at 390. 
31. Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
32. "Section 153. Any person who . . .  after conviction of a felony, shall attempt to 
practice medicine, or shall so practice. . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on 
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty 
dollars, or imprisonment for six months for the first offense, and o n  conviction of any 
subsequent offense, by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment 
for not less than one year, or by both fine and imprisonment." Id. at 190. 
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the most intimate character. It is fitting, not m ere ly that he 
should possess a knowledge of diseases and their remedies, but 
also that he should be one who may safely be trusted to apply 
those remedies. Character is as important a qualification as 
knowledge, and if the legislature m�y prop�rly.
require a defi­
nite course of instruction, or a certam exammatlon as to learn­
ing, it may with equal propriet y �rescribe what evidence of 
good character shall be furnished. 
The Court found that physicians, perhaps more than any 
other state-regulated profession, are directly involved with mat­
ters of both personal and public health, thus justifying very in­
trusive regulation. Thus the Court found that defendant was 
denied the right to continue t o  p ractice medicine to protect the 
public, not as an additional punishment. The defendant's con­
viction and sentence were based on his failing to obey the new 
public health law, a new violation that would justify punishment 
under the criminal laws. He was not being additionally pun­
ished for his original crime of performing an abortion. 34 Key to 
the Court's opinion is the special status of medical practice and 
physicians. This reiterates the theme from earlier cases con­
testing licensing actions as depriving physicians o f  a property 
right without due process or c ompensation. 
b. Is There a Property Right to Practice Medicine?­
The Dent Case 
Most of the challenges to medical licensing laws and discipli­
nary actions taken under them are predicated on the assumption 
that the right to practice a profession is a quasi-property right, 
and as such cannot be infringed without due process and com­
pensation. 35 The Slaughter-House Cases36 are the first important 
post-Fourteenth Amendment review of occupational licensing 
under the p olice power. Louisiana passed a law creating a cor­
poration with the exclusive franchise to run slaughter-houses in 
33. Id. at 192-94. 
34. This same public safety analysis was used by the court to uphold a law that 
pro�ided for indefinite detention of sexually dangerous persons after they had served 
theu sentence and were about to be released from prison. See Kansas v. Hendricks 
521 U.S. 346 (1997). ' 
35. Int�r�stingly, because the states did not begin serious licensing efforts until 
after the ClVll War, we have no relevant cases before the Thirteenth and Fourteenth �mendments. Given the courts' broad deference to the states on licensing physicians 
m the face of these amendments, their passage clearly had little impact on the police power. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 36. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
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New Orleans and surrounding areas, covering an area of 1,154 
square miles. The butchers and others with affected businesses 
in the franchise area, more than 1,000 persons, brought suit, 
claiming that they had been deprived of property - their right 
to conduct their businesses - without due process and compen­
sation. While recognizing the validity of the complaint that their 
businesses would be rendered worthless by this act, the United 
States Supreme Court found that it was within the state's police 
power, and that this police power function had not been modi­
fied by the Fourteenth Amendment.37 This was affirmed and ex­
panded in subsequent cases,38 subject to the caveat that the 
regulations be proper measures to protect the public health, and 
not shams that used public health rhetoric to justify improper 
discriminatory regulations.39 
The United States Supreme Court addressed medical licens­
ing directly in Dent v. State of West Virginia.40 The West Virginia 
law provided three ways to become licensed: (1) graduate from 
a "a reputable medical college in the school of medicine to 
which the person desiring to practice belongs;"41 (2) practice 
"medicine in this state continuously for the period of ten years 
prior to the 8th day of March, one thousand eight hundred and 
eighty-one;"42 or (3) pass an examination by members of the 
state board of health.43 Persons who continued to practice 
medicine without fulfilling one of these requirements "shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined for every such offense not 
37. "The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that the defendant's 
charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, or that it 
denies to them the equal protection of the law. The first of these paragraphs has been 
in the Constitution since the adoption o f  the Fifth Amendment, as a restraint upon 
the Federal power. It is also to be found in some form of expression in the constitu­
tions of nearly all the States, as a restraint upon the power of the States. This law 
then, has practically been the same as it now is during the existence of the govern­
ment, except so far as the present amendment may place the restraining power over 
the States in this matter in the hands of the federal government. 
"We are not without judicial interpretation, therefore, both State and National, of 
the meaning of this clause. And it is sufficient to say that under no construction of 
that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the re­
straint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the 
butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning 
of that provision." Id. at 80-81. 
38. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
39. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
40. Dent v. West Va., 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
41. Id. at 231. 
42. Id. at 232. 
43. See id. 
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less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars. o r  imprisoned 
in the county jail not less than one month nor 1!1o re_ 
than twelve 
months, or be punished by both such fine and impnsonment, at 
the discretion of the court. "44 Defendant Dent had been prac­
ticing since 1876 and had a diploma from the Am�ric�n M�dic�I 
Eclectic College of Cincinnati, Ohio. After rev1ewmg this di­
ploma, the members of the b oard of health found that it was not 
from a "reputable" medical c ollege as intended by the statute . 
Defendant was indicted and convicted under the statute , or­
dered to pay fifty dollars, plus court costs, and, it is assumed, 
enjoined from continuing to practice medicine . Defendant ap­
pealed to the United States Supreme Court fro m  an adverse 
judgment in the state supreme court, claiming that he had been 
denied his property right in his profession without due process 
of law and due compensation. 
The balancing between the property right claim of the defend­
ant and the state's right to regulate under the police powers is 
best seen in the United States Supreme Court's own words in 
Dent. This statement of the constitutional limits o n  state licens­
ing of physicians has not been modified by subsequent deci­
sions.45 The court begins its analysis with a statement of the 
traditional view of the right to practice a professio n  or a trade as 
a property interest: 
It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States 
to follow any lawful calling, business, or professi o n  he may 
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon 
all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in 
many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our 
republican institutions. Here all vocations are open to every 
one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of live­
lihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for 
their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it  is some­
times termed, the 'estate,' acquired in them-that is,  the right 
to continue their prosecution-is often of great value to the 
44. Id. 
45. "In a line of earlier cases, this Court has indicated that the liberty component 
of the Fo.urteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process ng�t to choose one's field of private employment, but a right which is never­theless sub1ect to reasonable government regulation. See, e.g., Dent v. West Va., 129 U.S. 114,. 9 S.Ct-, �31 ,  (1889) (upholding a requirement of licensing before a person can practice med�cme); lfuax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, ( 1915) (invalidating on .equal prote�t�on grounds a state law requiring companies to employ 80 percent United Sta�es c1tiz�ns). These cases all deal with a complete prohibition of the right to engage m a calhng, and not the sort of brief interruption which occurred here." Conn v. Gabbert, 1 19 S.Ct. 1292, 1295 (1999). 
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possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any 
more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. 
But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right where its 
exercise is not permitted because of a failure to comply with 
conditions imposed by the state for the protection of society. 
The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its 
people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as in its 
judgment will secure or tend to secure them against the conse­
quences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception 
and fraud. As one means to this end it has been the practice of 
different states, from time immemorial,46 to exact in many pur­
suits a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the 
community may confidently rely; their possession being gener­
ally ascertained upon an examination of parties by competent 
persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a 
diploma or license from an institution established for instruc­
tion on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such 
pursuits have to deal. The nature and extent of the qualifica­
tions required must depend primarily upon the judgment of 
the state as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the 
calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or ap­
plication, no objection to their validity can be raised because 
of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no 
relation to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by 
such reasonable study and application, that they can operate 
to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation. 
Few professions require more careful preparation by one 
who seeks to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with 
all those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health 
and life depend, and requires not only a knowledge of the 
properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the 
human body in all its complicated parts, and their relation to 
each other, as well as their influence upon the mind. The phy­
sician must be able to detect readily the presence of disease, 
and prescribe appropriate remedies for its removal. Every one 
may have occasion to consult him, but comparatively few can 
judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he pos­
sesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by 
his license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that 
respect, that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due 
consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may well 
induce the state to exclude from practice those who have not 
such a license, or who are found upon examination not to be 
46. It is interesting that the court uses the "time immemorial" language in the 
context of medical licensing, which was only newly adopted by the states. 
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fully qualified. The same reasons wh�ch control ii:t �mp?sing 
conditions, upon compliance with which the physician is al­
lowed to practice in the first instance, may call for further con­
ditions as new modes of treating disease are discovered,  or a 
more thorough acquaintance is obtained of the remedial 
properties of vegetable and mineral substances, or a more ac­
curate knowledge is acquired of the human system and of the 
agencies by which it is affected. It would not be deemed a 
matter for serious discussion that a knowledge of the new ac­
quisitions of the profession, as it from time to time a dvances in 
its attainments for the relief of the sick and suffering, should 
be required for continuance in its practice, but for the earnest­
ness with which the plaintiff in error insists that by being com­
pelled to obtain the certificate required, and prevented from 
continuing in his practice without it, he is deprived of his right 
and estate in his profession without due process of law. We 
perceive nothing in the statute which indicates an intention of 
the legislature to deprive one of any of his rights.47 
Dent is emblematic of the deference the United States 
Supreme Court accords state m edical licensing laws.48 As re­
viewed below, state court decisions accord with this ,  finding few 
real impediments to state regulatory action. Dent and its prog­
eny left the states wide discretion in the content and enforce­
ment of medical licensing laws, subj ect to state constitutional 
law protections and the political power of the regulated groups. 
Cases like Dent, which dealt with initial access to the profession, 
raised only limited due process i s sues because they involved just 
comparing the candidate's credentials to the state standards. 
Even when, as in Dent, there was a n  element of judgment about 
whether the practitioner's medical school was credible, that was 
seen to be totally within the board's discretion and provided no 
grounds for review.49 A licensed physician is entitled to more 
extensive due process protections if the licensing board decides 
to suspend, revoke, or not renew the physician's l i cense.50 The 
extent of this process is determined by state administrative pro­
cedure acts, subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations 
47. See Dent, 129 U.S. 121-23. 
48. See Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926); Graves v. Minnesota, 
272 U.S. 425 (1926); B arsky v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
49. State ex rel. Powell v. State Med. Examining Bd., 20 N.W. 238, (Minn. 1884); 
State ex rel. C�apman v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 26 N.W. 123 (Minn. 1885). 
50. �e
.
se nght
_
s may be very limited if the revocation is based o n  a clear violation 
of a condition of hcensure, such as being convicted of a felony. See Cooper v. State 
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 489 S.W. 2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso, 1 972). 
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on a state actor.51 A physician who is improperly sanctioned by 
a state licensing board may be entitled to injunctive relief, but 
there is little chance of recovering damages from either the state 
or the members of the board. 52 
c. Defining and Limiting the Practice of Medicine 
Implicit in the state's power to require an individual to obtain 
a license to practice medicine is the power to determine the 
scope of the license and to establish conduct that may not be 
performed by licensed physicians. Historically, the most contro­
versial laws restricting the physicians' scope of practice regu­
lated narcotics and abortions. The United States Supreme 
Court first ruled on state narcotics law restrictions on physicians 
in Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson,53 which concerned 
the appeal of a physician convicted under a state law making it 
illegal to dispense narcotics directly to an addict. 54 The intent of 
the state law was to force addicts to get their drugs by a written 
prescription so that there would be a documented record of 
their drug use. Defendant physician was convicted of supplying 
an addict directly from the physician's office stock of narcotics. 
The defendant appealed, arguing that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment prohibited the licensing agency from regulating defend­
ant's business as provided for in the statute, and that the state 
law was in conflict with the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Drug Act.55 
51. For example, the board may not condition licensure on providing information 
that is otherwise constitutionally protected from disclosure by the Fifth Amendment. 
See Hirsch v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 600 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991). The 
board must also not engage in entrapment. See Patty v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 508 
P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1973). See generally Lind v. Med. Licensing Bd., 427 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 198 1 ) .  
52. " . . . [T]he risk of a n  unconstitutional act b y  one presiding at an agency hearing 
is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent judgment of 
these men and women. We therefore hold that persons subject to these restraints and 
performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute 
immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 
478, 514 (1978). See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (Mem) (13 Wall.) (1872); and 
Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1 992) (overruling Manion v. Michigan Bd. of 
Med., 765 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
53. Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. M artinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921).  
54. " 'It  shall be unlawful for any physician or dentist to furnish to or prescribe, for 
the use of any habitual user of the same, any of the substances enumerated in section 
1 of this act: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to 
prevent any legally licensed physician from prescribing in good faith, for the use of 
any patient under his care, for the treatment of a drug habit, such substances as he 
may deem necessary for such treatment; provided that such prescriptions are given in 
good faith for the treatment of such habit. ' "  Id. at 44. 
55. 38 Stat. 785 c.1 (1914). 
220 Annals of Health Law [Vol. 8 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding 
that: 
There can be no question of the authority of the state in the 
exercise of its police power to regulate the adrni�istrati?n, 
sale, prescription and use of dangerous and
. 
hab1t-form1.ng drugs, such as are named in the statute. The nght to. exercise this power is so manifest in the interest of the publ�c he�lth 
and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon a d1scuss10n 
of it beyond saying that it is too firmly established to be suc­
cessfully called in question.56 
This ruling was reaffirmed in Robinson v. California,51 a deci­
sion that otherwise limited the state's ability to punish a person 
for the status of being an addict. Given the financial tempta­
tions to provide narcotics and o ther psychoactive drugs to ad­
dicts, many physicians have lost their licenses and even been 
jailed for violating the terms o f  the controlled substances laws.58 
The United S tates Supreme Court approved the combination of 
traditional public health reporting duties with the controlled 
substances laws in Whalen v. Roe.59 Whalen was a challenge by 
physicians and patients to a New York law that required the re­
porting of all prescriptions for S chedule II drugs60 to a central 
state agency. This agency could then check the prescriptions to 
detect improper prescribing practices, forged p rescriptions, 
pharmacies that were dispensing unusual amounts of Schedule 
II drugs, and patients that were filling prescriptions from multi­
ple physicians. The physicians and patients argued that the law 
invaded the p atient's privacy, deterred them from receiving 
proper medication because of their fears of being reported to 
56. Whipple, 256 U.S. at 45. 
57. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
58. See Application of Palmer, 275 A .D. 5, 87 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 
1949); Stolz v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 4 A.D.2d 361,  165 N.Y.S.2d 
179 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1957); Ray v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 9 
A.D.2d 560, 189 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 1959); Leonard v. State, 356 S.W.2d 
926 (Tex . . Crim. App. 1962); Thorpe v. Board of Exam'rs, 163 Cal. Rptr. 382, (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1980); Arlen v. State, 399 N.E.2d 1251 (Ohio 1980); Lind v. Med. Licens­
ing Bd., 427 .N.E.2d 671 (Ind. �t. App. 1 981);  Horvat v. Commonwealth Dept. of Stat� Profess1onal and Occupational Affairs, 563 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Cmmw. 1989); and 
Demer v. State Bd. of Med., Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs 683 
A.2d 949 (Pa. Cmmw. 1996). 
' 
59. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
60. The New York law used the classification from the federal controlled sub­
s�ances laws, whic� i.s based o� �ve sche�ules. Schedule I covers drugs, such as her­om, th.at are prohibited for chmcal use m the United States because of their high potential for a�mse. Schedule II covers drugs that have a high potential for abuse, such as morphine, but that are used clinically in the United States. 
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the state, and improperly interfered with the physician's right to 
practice m edicine. These claims were predicated largely on the 
holdings in the contraceptive and abortion cases,  the sole area 
where the courts have found significant constitutional limita­
tions on the state's  right to regulate medical practice. The court 
rejected this comparison, finding that physician reporting was a 
valid public h ealth function that did not pose an unconstitu­
tional burden on the patient's right to privacy,61 and later ex­
tending this holding to include reporting of abortion-related 
information. 62 
The abortion and contraceptio n  cases, while creating broad 
rights of p rivacy for patients, create only very limited rights for 
physicians. From the perspective of the police power to regulate 
medical practice, physicians are only bystanders in these cases. 
Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,63 the courts have first 
had to wrestle  with whether p hysicians have standing in these 
cases at all, despite the substantive reality that the physician is 
being prosecuted for a crime based on the law. Griswold held 
that the physicians had standin g  to assert the rights of their pa­
tients to challenge the Conne cticut law because of the special 
relationship between them and their patients.64 In essence, the 
court found that the physicians had standing b ecause the state 
was using them as the mechanism for forbidding the dissemina­
tion of the information about contraception. While the court in 
Griswold did not elaborate on this analysis, it underlies the deci­
sions in the later abortion cases as they apply to physicians. The 
key to this approach is recognizing the unspoken assumption 
that physicians are involved b ecause the state has restricted the 
provision of these particular m edical services to physicians. For 
example, assume that Connecticut had allowed pharmacists to 
provide contraceptive information and to prescribe and fit con­
traceptives, while still making it  illegal for physicians to do so. 
In this situation the patient's right to privacy would not have 
been invaded and thus the physician would have not had any 
standing to contest his conviction under the law.65 
61. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600. 
62. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 
(1992). 
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
64. "The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or ad­
versely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have 
this kind of confidential relation to them." Id. at 481. 
65. There are circumstances where physicians have been sanctioned by license 
revocation for providing medical services that might legally have been provided by a 
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This analysis carries through the subsequen! a bortion cases, i? 
that physicians are only able to assert standing and the physi­
cian-patient relationship is only protected to the e�tent that th� 
state has decreed that abortions be done or supervised by physi­
cians. Because no state has prohibited physicians from perform­
ing abortions while allowing them to be perform�d by anoth�r 
group, perhaps nurses, it is i mpossibl� �o determine if ther� ts 
any constitutional right to have a physician-performed abortion, 
as opposed to a right to an abortion.66 In Roe v. Wade, the court 
found that the physician did not have standing at all in the case, 
even though it was the appeal of a state law providing for crimi­
nal prosecution of physicians and others who performed abor­
tions.67 Thus the state's right to regulate medical practice is only 
limited when it uses that right to impermissibly interfere with 
the constitutional rights of p atients. Subject to this limitation, 
physicians have no constitutio nally protected sphere of practice 
that is not subject to state regulation. Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey68 emphasized this distinction 
between patient and physician rights by preserving basic pa­
tient's rights established in Roe, but allowing the state to regu­
late the physicians providing the abortions in the s a me way that 
they could have regulated them in providing other medical 
treatments.69 This right to regulate medical practice was 
strengthened in the recent cases upholding the state police 
power to regulate medical p ractice by banning physician-as-
non-physician. See In re Guess, 393 S.E. 2d 833 (N.C. 1990), which upheld the revoca­
tion of a physician's license for practicing homeopathic medicine, regardless of 
whether the state could show that homeopathic medicine posed a threat to the pa­
tient's health. 
66. Such a right to a physician-performed abortion might arise if it could be shown 
that the state interfered with the right of  access to abortions by designating who could 
perform them. Fa� example, if the state limited abortions to lay abortion providers 
and there was evidence that such providers substantially increased the risk of 
complications. 
�?· The c�mrt f<?�nd that the physician could assert any constitutional defenses 
ansmg from its decision during his pending state criminal law prosecutions. Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
68. Pl�n�ed Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
69. This is clea� from the co1:1rt's own analogy: "We also see no reason why the �tale may n�t reqmre doctors to mform a woman seeking an abortion of the availabil­
ity of matenals relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those conse­
quences �ave
_ 
n o  dir�ct �elation to her health. An example illustrates the point. We 
:-vould thmk it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to be 
�nforme� consent to_ a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with mformat10n about nsks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself." Id. at 882-83. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
----------------------------·········-··-· 
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sisted suicide. 70 Interestingly, these cases hinted that there 
might be a constitutional right to adequate pain relief, which 
would be the first significant limitation on the state's right to 
limit access to drugs through controlled substance laws and phy­
sician licensing restrictions. 7 1  
II. REGULATING MEDICAL PRACTICE IN MCOs 
The central regulatory issue for MCOs is that they are gener­
ally exempt from the states' existing system of regulating insur­
ance because of the Employee R etirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"). ERISA was passed to regularize the administra­
tion of pension plans and to protect their assets from improper 
or improvident management.72 The- BRISA provisions dealing 
with health insurance were passed by Congress to allow large 
multi-state companies such as a utomobile manufacturers to sign 
uniform labor agreements across all state lines. Prior to ERISA, 
a multi-state employer could not offer the same health insurance 
plan to all employees because of differences in state laws regu­
lating insurance. Even if the terms of the plan could be worked 
out, there was a substantial administrative cost in getting the 
plans approved in fifty different states, and assuring continuing 
compliance as the state laws changed over time. ERISA pro­
vides that health insurance plans that meet certain organiza­
tional requirements are exempt from most state regulation. 
Most private employer health plans meet this standard. Since 
there is little federal regulation of private health insurance, this 
means that ERISA plans are essentially unregulated. The insu­
lation from state regulation gives BRISA plans a competitive 
70. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and Vacca v. Quill, 521 
U.S. 793 (1997). 
71. "The parties and amici agree that i n  these States a patient who is suffering 
from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to 
obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the 
point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death. See WASH. REv. CODE 
§ 70.122.010 ( 1 994); Brief for Petitioners in No. 95-1858, p. 15, n. 9; Brief for Respon­
dents in No. 95-1858, p. 15. In this light, even assuming that we would recognize such 
an interest, I agree that the State's interests in protecting those who are not truly 
competent or facing imminent death, or those whose decisions to hasten death would 
not truly be voluntary, are sufficiently weighty to justify a prohibition against physi­
cian-assisted suicide." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 2303 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
72. This discussion of ERISA adapted from EDWARD P. RICHARDS AND KATHA­
RINE c. RATHBUN, MEDICAL CARE LAW (Aspen 1999). 
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advantage, so they have displaced non-ERISA plans for most 
employers.73 
A. ERISA Preemption and State Regulation 
ERISA plans differ from traditional insurance pol.icies �e­cause the employer usually r etains some or all o f  the nsk of in­
surance and pays the insurer for administration o f  the b�nefits 
rather than for a guaranteed rate for the year. The care is pro­
vided by either an MCO controlled by the plan administrator, 
an MCO, o r  individual physicians and clinics contracting directly 
with the plan administrator. Because the employer is less insu­
lated from the costs than in traditional plans, there is more pres­
sure to keep costs down during the term of the plan. If there are 
unexpected costs, they are p assed on to the employer, which 
puts pressure on the employer to limit coverage for expensive 
procedures and conditions. Under ERISA, employers are free 
to limit the benefits provide d  by their health plans, subject to 
certain Americans with Disabilities Act limitations.74 As a re­
sult, some plans provide inadequate coverage for medically nec­
essary treatments. 
ERISA plans are also insulated from medical malpractice 
lawsuits in most circumstances. The text of ERISA does not 
mention medical malpractice lawsuits and there was no discus­
sion of them in the Congressional hearings preceding the adop­
tion of ERISA. Nonetheless, the broad language of ERISA that 
exempts it from state regulation has been construed by the 
courts to prevent state tort lawsuits against ERISA plans.75 In 
most cases where a denial of benefits is challenged because the 
plan claimed they were exclud e d  under the contract, courts find 
the claims to be preempted.76 The courts have also limited di­
rect actions against the plans for medical malpractice, except for 
traditional vicarious liability for physician employees. Since 
most plans do not employ physicians directly, this provides lim­
ited relief for plaintiffs. BRISA does not affect the physician's 
liability for medical malpractice, so the physician is left as the 
73. ERISA plans account for about 50% of insured lives with most of the rest 
being covered by governmental employee health insura�ce or Medicare and 
Medicaid. 
74. See Ford v.  Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 , 604-05 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. 
deni�d, 119 S.Ct. 850 (1999); Castellano v.  NewYork, 142 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1 158, 1160-61 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
75. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). 
76. See Katz v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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target defendant when the plaintiff's case against the plan is dis­
missed. This encourages ERISA MCOs to use benefits adminis­
tration systems that create incentives for physicians to breach 
their fiduciary duty to their patients by denying them medically 
necessary treatments, even when those treatments are covered 
by the health plan. 
The clearest conflicts between the demands of MCOs and the 
physician's fiduciary duty to the patient arise from the "gag" 
rules, which are MCO contract provisions intended to prevent 
physicians from telling patients medically significant informa­
tion, or from indicating that the plan might not be treating the 
patient fairly. A typical clause reads as follows: 
Physician shall agree not to take any action or make any com­
munication which undermines or could undermine the confi­
dence of enrollees, potential enrollees, their employers, their 
unions, or the public in U.S. Healthcare or the quality of U.S. 
Healthcare coverage. Physician shall keep the Proprietary In­
formation payment rates, utilization-review procedures, etc. 
and this Agreement strictly confidential.77 
Even when the plans do not have formal "gag" rules, the phy­
sicians are discouraged from discussing financial incentives with 
the patients. This is enforced by sanctions for not being a team 
player, or other criteria that are based on furthering the plan's 
interests. More fundamentally, the physicians have an economic 
stake in not making the patients aware of necessary treatments 
because the physcians are evaluated on the cost of care for their 
patients. If physicians help patients get all the care they are en­
titled to under the plan, the physicians will be penalized by the 
plan and eventually deselected, o r  fired, by the plan.78 The re­
sults of such policies are demonstrated by some of the cases that 
have been brought by plaintiffs attempting to defeat ERISA 
preemption so they can get compensation from the plans. 
In the Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation case,79 the court re­
viewed the legality of hidden MCO provisions in a Kaiser health 
plan that provided financial incentives for physicians to deny pa­
tients care. In 1991, an eleven-year-old child was taken to the 
physician complaining of nausea and severe daily headaches on 
77. Seffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Cor­
porate Proposition for Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1706 (Dec. 21, 1995). 
78. Brian A Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Main­
taining Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care, 72 N.D. L. REv. 
799 (1997). 
79. Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1 137 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
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the right side of her head. She was examined, but no diagnost ic 
tests were performed. The physician prescribed adult strength 
narcotic p ainkillers. Her cond ition did not res'?lve a�d �he con­
tinued to see the physician through 1995. Dunng this time.' �he prescriptions were continued but the primary care physician 
never consulted with a neurologist.  In 1996, the school psychol­
ogist, alarmed at the child's "intense, localized headaches, 
vomiting, and blood-shot eyes," persuaded the parents to d�­
mand that the child receive a proper neurologic workup and di­
agnostic testing. The child was found to have a brain tumor that 
had displaced forty percent o f  her brain. After extensive sur­
geries, she still had substantial impairment and the prospect of 
more surgery in the future. 
It appeared, under the facts of this case, that this systematic 
malpractice was financially motivated because there was evi­
dence that throughout the n early five-year period the defendant 
physicians treated the patient, Kaiser and the Medical Group 
had in place a financial incentive program that p aid physicians 
bonuses for avoiding excessive treatments and tests.  This same 
type of incentive was present in Shea v. Esensten .80 The court's 
summary of Mr. Shea's medical care is poignant: 
After being hospitalized for severe chest pains during an over­
seas business trip, Patrick Shea made several visits to his long­
time family doctor. During these visits, Mr. Shea discussed his 
extensive family history of heart disease, and indicated he was 
suffering from chest pains, shortness of breath, muscle tingling, 
and dizziness. Despite all the warning signs, Mr. Shea's doctor 
said a referral to a cardiologist was unnecessary. When Mr. 
Shea's symptoms did not improve, he offered to pay for the 
cardiologist himself. At that point, Mr. Shea's doctor per­
suaded Mr. Shea, who was then forty years old, that he was too 
you�g an? did not have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a 
card1olog1st. A few months later, Mr. Shea died of a heart 
attack.81 
These claims �re typical o� the cases brought a gainst MCOs. 
They are, at theu core, medical malpractice cases because the 
physicia�s delivere� s�bstandard care. Irrespective of ERISA 
preemption, the plamtiffs can p revail in traditional medical mal­
practice litigation against the physicians. They are also not fun­
damentally different from some cases that occurred under 
traditional fee-for-service medicine, in that there have always 
80. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). 
81. Id. at 626. 
1999] Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice 227 
been physicians who put their own financial interests above the 
well-being of their patients. The result was usually over-treat­
ment, rather than under-treatment, but that can be just as 
deadly to the patient. Most critically, the physicians are the 
same; MCOs either bought existing practices or recruited their 
physicians from these practices. The vast majority of MCO phy­
sicians were fee-for-service physicians ten years ago. Yet, while 
fee-for-service certainly had problems, it did not generate the 
public concern and calls for state regulation that MCOs have 
engendered. While some of the concern about MCOs is dis­
placed from general anxiety about rising health care costs, 
MCOs do pose unique problems that demand new regulatory 
responses. 
B. Checks and Balances in MCOs 
Traditional fee-for-service m edicine, paid for with indemnity 
insurance plans that paid for all care that the patient's physician 
deemed medically necessary, h a d  several checks and balances 
that operated to protect the quality of patient care. These have 
been eliminated by MCOs. 
1 .  Physician Independence 
Physicians were traditionally independent decision makers, 
operating for their own self-interest, either as sole proprietors or 
in small partnerships. This style of business organization was 
driven by state bars on the corporate practice of medicine.82 
Arising in cases decided in the 1920s and 1930s,83 they were 
based on conflict of interest doctrines developed for legal prac­
tice. 84 Corporate practice of medicine bars prevented physicians 
82. See Mars, The Corporate Practice Of Medicine: A Call For Action; 7 HEALTH 
MATRIX 241 (1997); Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An 
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 V AND. L. REv. 445 (1987); St. 
Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606 (Kan. 1994); Sampson v. Baptist Mem. 
Hosp. Sys., 940 S.W. 2d 128 (Tex. App. 1 996). 
83. See People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 209 P. 363 (Cal. 1922); Dr. Allison, 
Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799 (Ill. 1935); Parker v. Board of Dental Exam'rs, 
14 P. 2d 67 (Cal. 1 932); People v. United Med. Serv., Inc., 200 N.E. 157 (Ill. 1936). 
84. "The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited 
and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be 
delegated without consent and it cannot exist between an attorney employed by a 
corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would be 
subject to the directions of the corporation and not to the directions of the client. 
There would be neither contract nor privity between him and the client, and he would 
not owe even the duty of counsel to the actual litigant. The corporation would control 
the litigation, the money earned would belong to the corporation and the attorney 
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from working for non-physicians who would then profit .fro:n the physician's work. While this did prevent son:iC: abuses, 1t did 
not protect patients from individual greedy p�ys!cians who we.re willing to subvert patient care to the physician s ow� �nancial 
gain. It did mean that if the p atient saw. another p hys1c�an, th�t physician would probably not be profitmg by the �rst s phy�1-
cian greed and would independently evaluate the pat�ent. Whtie 
such independent evaluation is usually thought o f  m terms 
_
of 
formal second opinions for surgery and other procedures, its 
most important manifestation is  in routine care by dif
_
f e
_
rent spe­
cialists. Few patients sought out formal second opm1ons, but 
most patients would discuss their care with all o f  their physi­
cians, giving their internist a chance to raise questions about 
proposed surgery, for example. 
MCOs undermine this ind e pendence in two ways. First, as 
discussed below, they elimin ate patient self-referral. Second, 
they give physicians powerful financial incentives to provide less 
care to patients. These can b e  "hold-backs," or money withheld 
from the p hysician's pay and only returned if the physician 
meets cost-cutting goals; partial or complete capitation, where 
the physician is paid a flat rate for caring for the patients and 
has to pay for extra care out of this payment; or economic 
deselection ,  where the physician is no longer allowed to partici­
pate in the plan, if the physician does not meet the MCO's eco­
nomic goals. In most communities deselection by a couple of 
plans will put the physician out of business. For physicians em­
ployed by the MCOs, deselection is accompanied by anti-com­
pete agreements in their contracts with the MCO, which will 
would be responsible to the corporation only. His master would not be the client but 
the corporation, conducted it may be wholly by laymen, organized simply to make 
money and not to aid in the administration of justice which is the highest function of 
an attorney and counselor at law. The corporation might not have _a lawyer among its 
stockhol?ers, directors or officers. Its members might be without character, learning 
or st�ndmg . . Tuer� .would be no rem�dy by attachment or disbarment to protect the pubhc from 1mpos1t1on or fraud, no stimulus to good conduct from the traditions of an 
ancient and h onorable profession, and no guide except the sordid purpose to earn 
mone� for stockholders. The bar, which is  an institution of the highest usefulness and 
standing, would be degraded if even its humblest member became subject to the or­
ders. of a money-making corporation engaged not in conducting litigation for itself, but. 11:1 the business of conducting litigation for others. The degradation of the bar is 
an m1ury to the state." �n re .co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910). This was �dopted by. �e Cahforrua Supreme Court in its decisions barring the corporate 
practice of med1cme. See People ex rel. Bd.  of Med. Exam'rs v. Pacific Health Corp. 
Inc., 82 P.2d 429, 430 (Cal. 1938); People v. Merchant's Protective Corp., 209 P. 363 
(Cal. 1922). 
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keep them from practicing medicine in their community if they 
are deselected. Deselection poses the economic death penalty 
for both independent contractor and employed physicians. 
Deselection is also immediate,  making the linkage between the 
cost of care given patients and the physician's own economic 
well-being very clear. Conversely, possible medical malpractice 
litigation, the only sanction for dangerous under-treatment, is a 
vague future threat. Lawsuits a re only filed months to years af­
ter the care is rendered and they take years more to resolve. 
The discounted present value of a potential lawsuit over im­
proper medical care is very low compared to immediate threat 
of deselection. The MCO itself is immune to medical malprac­
tice litigation as long as it does not employ physicians. As long 
as there are excess physicians i n  the community, the MCO has 
an incentive to push its physicians to the edge of malpractice to 
save money. 
2. Patient Self-Referral 
Patients traditionally could choose their own physicians, de­
cide when they wanted to chance physicians, and see specialists 
when they wanted and for whatever condition they wanted. 
Again, this did not always work to the patient's benefit because 
patients usually did not have enough informa tion to make 
choices based on quality of care, and it encouraged hypochon­
dria. However, it  did increase the chance that one physician's 
errors would be seen and corrected by a second physician. 
MCOs limit or eliminate patient self-referral by forcing pa­
tients to see physicians from an approved list of specialists and 
by requiring that the patient 's  primary care physician, com­
monly called the gatekeeper p hysician, approve all referrals. 
This prevents the patient from getting an independent second 
opinion. It also assures that the patient will see as few physi­
cians as possible, limiting the chance that errors in diagnosis or 
treatment will be identified and corrected. The most extreme 
limit on patient self-referral is to prevent the patient from seeing 
a physician at all, which some plans have implemented by using 
nurses for primary care. 
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3. Hospital Staff Credentialing 
In a post-Darling85 world, h ospita�s had �n incent��e to as�ure 
that physicians provided goo d  quahty p�ti�nt  care. �ospitals 
also had an incentive to encourage physicians t o  provide more 
medical care because reimbursement was based on services pro­
vided.87 As
' MCOs gain m arket share, they negotiate bulk 
purchase agreements with h ospitals for bed and c�r� rates .. Im­
plicit in these agreements i s  that t�e plan'� phys1c1.an.s will be 
allowed to treat patients in t h e  hospital, puttm g  i rres1st1ble pres­
sure on hospitals to limit their own credentialing process. I n  
some cases, the medical staff credentialing is d elegated to the 
MCO. 
4. Benefits o f  Over-treatment 
Over-treatment is a danger to patients, whether it is done by a 
dangerous incompetent such as the infamous D r .  Nork,88 or a 
well meaning physician who loses sight of the p o tential risks of 
what seems like harmless extra care. 89 On balance, however, 
over-treatment is less dangerous than under-treatment, espe­
cially when dealing with diagnostic tests. MCOs are correct 
when they argue that physicians in fee-for-service systems order 
unnecessary diagnostic tests. What is unsaid is why these tests 
were ordered. If the physicians knew they were unnecessary 
and only ordered them to make the laboratories rich, then it is 
logical to believe that limiting the tests physicians order will 
cause them to only order the right tests. Contrary to this as­
sumption,  most physicians were honest prior to MCOs and or­
dered too many tests becaus e  they did not know which ones 
85. See D arling v. Charleston Community Mem'I. Hosp., 2 1 1 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 
1965). (This is the lead case establishing hospital liability for independent contractor 
physicians.) 
86. Credentialing was not a perfect mechanism because it was controlled by physi­
cians w
_hose personal interests were sometimes at odds with the hospital's interests. See Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 824 (3d Cir. 1984); Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., 
Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1 226 (Dist. Ct. Del. 1 986); Patrick v. Burget 486 U.S. 94 (1988); 
Bryan v. James E.  Holmes Reg'l. Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1994). 
87. Hospital credentialing began to erode as a safeguard when D RGs were intro­
duced, giving the hospital an incentive to  d o  economic credentialing and remove phy­
sicians who did not discharge the patient quickly enough from the hospital. 
88. See Gonzalez v. Nork, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (rev'd on other 
grounds), reprinted in LIABILITY AND QUALITY IssuEs IN HEALTH CARE 25 (Barry 
R. Furrow et al. eds., 1991). 
89. Perhaps the most common example is antibiotic overuse. See Howard S. Gold 
and Robert C. Moellering, Drug Therapy: Antimicrobial-Drug Resistance, 335 NEw 
ENG. J. MED. 1445 (Nov. 7, 1996). 
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were important. Putting these same physicians in an environ­
ment where they are not allowed to order many tests does not 
make them more skillful in ordering tests. If they are forced to 
order fewer tests, they are more likely to miss necessary tests. 
C. C ontrolling MCOs Through Medical Licensing 
MCOs depend on physicians for three key functions: (1) pro­
viding direct medical services; (2) supervising non-physician per­
sonnel ("NPPs"); and (3) medical director services reviewing the 
care provided by other physicians and NPPs, determining 
whether care recommended b y  treating physicians is medically 
necessary,90 and setting medical standards for the organization. 
The first two functions are clearly the practice of medicine and 
subject to state regulation through the licensing board. The 
third function combines activities that are administrative with 
others that are subject to regulation as practice of medicine. 
This issue was litigated in Murphy v. Board of Medical Examin­
ers of State of Arizona91 and found to be within the state's police 
power to define and regulate the practice of medicine. 
1 .  The Murphy Case 
At this point in time, Murphy is the only case to directly ad­
dress whether a medical director in an MCO is practicing 
medicine w hen the medical director is prospectively reviewing a 
recommended treatment to determine if it is medically neces­
sary and thus whether the patient will be able to have the treat­
ment.92 Dr. Murphy was the medical director of Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Arizona ("Blue Cross"). He filed this lawsuit to 
contest the authority of the Arizona Board of Medical Examin­
ers ("BOMEX") to review and criticize his medical necessity de-
90. Denial of benefits cases involve three questions: (1) whether the requested 
benefit is covered for anyone at any time, i.e., whether it is excluded by the insurance 
contract; (2) if  the benefit is covered, whether it is medically necessary for this patient; 
and (3) if the benefit is covered and medically necessary, who is going to do it and at 
what facility. 
91. Murphy v. Board of Med. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, 1997). 
92. This article does not address the related issue of whether patients injured by a 
decision to deny care should be entitled to sue medical directors and insurance plans. 
These two issues are not legally linked since the state's police power is much more 
extensive than a plaintiff's right to compensation for an activity that is also sub ject to 
police power regulation. For a discussion o f  liability for utilization review decisions, 
see also J. Scott Andresen, Is Utilization R eview The Practice Of Medicine? Imp lica­
tions For Managed Care Administ rat o rs, 19  J. LEGAL MED. 431 (1998); Jeffrey E. 
Shuren, Legal Acco untability For Uti l ization Review In ER/SA Health Plans, 77 N.C. 
L. REV. 731 (1999). 
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cisions for Blue Cross. The case arose when
_ 
Dr. Murphy 
refused to "pre-certify" a patient for laparoscop1c cholecystec­
tomy, despite the recomm�ndat!ons of th� patient's surgeon.93 
Tue patient filed a complaint with the Anzona Department of 
Insurance ,  alleging that Blue Cross refused to honor the terms 
of its insurance contract. The Department o f  Insurance re­
viewed the claim, but determined that there was n o  violation
.
of 
the Arizona insurance code.  94 The surgeon filed a complaint 
with the B OMEX alleging unprofessional conduct on the part of 
Dr. Murphy.95 
The B O MEX wrote Dr. Murphy a letter expressing its con­
cern that his decision might have endangered the patient.96 Dr. 
Murphy filed two lawsuits contesting the BOMEX's authority 
_
to 
review his actions as medical director, the procedure used to is­
sue the letter, and the substantive basis for criticism, and he re­
quested a temporary restraining order to prevent the issuance of 
the letter. Though the B OMEX prevailed on the procedural 
claims, the key issue was whether the BOMEX had j urisdiction 
to review his actions.97 The plaintiff contested j urisdiction on 
93. If the plan refuses to pre-certify the surgery, it is telling the patient that it will 
not pay for the surgery and that the patient will have to find other means of payment. 
In this case, the surgeon did the surgery anyway, believing it was critical to the pa­
tient's health. The plan ultimately paid for the surgery because the pathology report 
on the removed tissue indicated that the surgery was necessary. Murphy, 949 P.2d at 
532. 
94. See id. at 533. This ruling is not surprising, given that most state insurance 
laws are concerned only with the procedure for filing and resolving claims, not the 
accuracy of medical determinations. "Moreover, before patients can obtain relief 
from ADI, they must first show that failure to pay for reasonable and necessary medi­
cal services occurs 'with such a frequency to indicate . . .  a general business practice.' 
A.R.S. § 20- 461(A)(16). This statutory limitation hinders patients such as S.B . who 
are complaining of single occurrences from obtaining any relief from AD I." Id. at 536. 
95. "Dr. Johnson chose a different course; he sent BOMEX a letter complaining 
of Dr. Murphy's 'unprofessional conduct' and 'medical incompetence' associated with 
the .r7jection of S.B.'s pre-certification request. Dr. Johnson alleged that Dr. Murphy's dec1s10n caused S.B. to question Dr. Johnson's professional judgment and to waver in 
her decision to proceed with surgery that was not covered by insurance. Dr. Johnson 
also maintained that the physician-patient relationship he established with S.B. suf­
fered 'to a dangerous degree."' Id. at 533.  
%. "The Board voted to resolve the case by issuing Dr. Murphy an advisory letter 
of concern regarding 'an inappropriate medical decision which could have caused 
harm to a patient. '"  Id. at 534. 
97. In fact, the BOMEX's procedure of issuing the letter without giving Dr. Mur­
phy a chance to respond in person, coupled with certain other irregularities, might not 
have been acceptable under some other state codes of administrative procedure. See 
Thebaut v. Georgia_ Bd. of Dentistry, 509 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. App. 1998). It should be 
a.ssumed that had the Arizona APA given Dr. Murphy more extensive procedural nghts, the BOMEX would have modified its procedures accordingly. 
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the grounds that he was not practicing medicine as defined in 
the enabling legislation for the BOMEX, and that medical ne­
cessity decisions are insurance determinations and thus subject 
to Arizona Department of Insurance regulation only.98 Consis­
tent with the state's medical licensing laws, the court found that 
the BOMEX's "primary duty is 'to protect the public from un­
lawful, incompetent, unqualified, impaired or unprofessional 
practitioners' of medicine in the state."99 The court then re­
viewed the defendant's actions in light of the Arizona statutory 
definition of  medical practice: 100 
Although Dr. Murphy is not engaged in the traditional prac­
tice of medicine, to the extent that he renders medical deci­
sions his conduct is reviewable by BOMEX. Here, Dr. 
Murphy evaluated information provided by both the patient's 
primary physician and her surgeon. He disagreed with their 
decision that gallbladder surgery would alleviate her ongoing 
symptoms. S.B. 's doctors diagnosed a medical condition and 
proposed a non-experimental course of treatment. Dr. Mur­
phy substituted his medical judgment for theirs and deter­
mined that the surgery was ' not medically necessary.'  There is 
no other way to characterize Dr. Murphy's decision: it was a 
'medical' decision.101 
The court found that there was nothing in the state insurance 
regulations to prevent the BO MEX from exercising this jurisdic­
tion because Dr. Murphy was not providing insurance coverage 
but was employed to make medical decisions. This is consistent 
with the E RISA cases that find that there is no ERISA preemp­
tion of medical malpractice lawsuits against physicians em­
ployed by ERISA plans to provide medical care.102 There is 
98. The plaintiff did not raise ERISA directly at the trial court. While it was 
raised by amici at the appellate level, the court declined to consider it. Id. at 533, n.4. 
99. Id. at 535-36. 
100. "Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ('A.RS.') §32-1401(21) (formerly 
(17)) defines the practice of medicine as 'the diagnosis, the treatment or the correc­
tion of or the attempt or the holding of oneself out as being able to diagnose, treat or 
correct any and all human diseases.' " Id. at 532, n.l. 
101. Id. at 536. 
102. "Counts I and II allege that Campbell and Pauls breached the applicable 
standard of care for medical providers in Virginia by failing to diagnose Lancaster's 
brain tumor. More specifically, these claims assert that Campbell and Pauls violated 
the standard of care by failing: (i) to order an MRI, EEG, or other diagnostic t�st, 
which would have disclosed Lancaster's tumor; (ii) to refer Lancaster to a neurologist; 
and (iii) to medicate Lancaster properly. These allegations, distilled to their essence, 
attack medical decisions concerning treatment, not administrative decisions concern­
ing benefits; they focus on a physician's medical determination concerning appropri­
ate treatment and medication, not on an administrator's decision to deny benefits as a 
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some division on the issue of whether medical necessity dc�i­
sions are covered by ERISA, 103 but the courts th�t  ha�e consid­
ered this issue have not had the benefit of state hcensmg board 
determinations. Because the federal government
_ 
leav�s the def­
inition of medical practice and the extent of hcensmg to the 
states 104 the courts should defer to a clear policy sta tement by 
state iicensing boards that medical decision making abo�t the 
care specific individual patients receive is alway s  the practice of 
medicine. 
D. A Strategy for Medical Licensing Boards 
Medical licensing boards must be more activ e  in se
_
tting ac­
ceptable parameters for medical practice in MCOs. This should 
be done o n  two levels: regulation of physicians p roviding direct 
patient care; and regulation o f  physicians providing medical di­
rector services. The guiding principles behind this regulation 
should be to assure that all physicians respect their fiduciary 
duty to their patients, and t h at all p hysicians adh e re to appropri­
ate standards for medical care. For physicians providing direct 
patient care, this means establishing clear professional standards 
that limit compensation agreements that put physicians in con­
flict with their patients' best interest.105 While MCOs complain 
matter of coverage or discretion; they attack the quality of treatment afforded Lancas­
ter as a patient, not the quantity of benefits provided Lancaster as a plan beneficiary. 
So viewed and understood, Counts I and II are entirely state malpractice claims that 
do not trigger  or implicate [sec.] 502(a)(l)(B) and hence provid e  no basis for the 
operation of the complete preemption doctrine." Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health 
Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1145-46 (E.D. Va. 1997); see also 
Nealy v. US Healthcare HMO, 93 N.Y. 2d 209, 1999 WL 161389 (N.Y. 1999). 
103. See Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 83 F. Supp. 1050, 17 
Employee Benefits Cas. 1030 (E.D.N.Y., 1993); Damare v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp. Med. Care Plan, 1993 WL 92503, 16 Employee Benefits Cas. 2789 (E.D. La., 
1993). 
104. With only a few exceptions, the federal pay programs such as Medicare will 
pay whatever provider the state allows to perform a service. Thus in some states 
Medicare will pay nurses to deliver services that are not reimbursable in other states. 
105. One aspect of this is reducing the coercive power of MCOs by banning anti­
com�ete agreements. To the extent that physicians in health plans are privy to confi­
dential business information - which is rarely the case for treating physicians - it 
can be protected under existing state trade secret laws. In Missouri, which will en­
force draconian restrictions agai�st physicians, restrictive covenants and non-compete 
agreements are banned as unethical for lawyers: Missouri recognizes the importance 
of the professional relationship for lawyers. "SUPREME COURT RULES FOR PROFES­
SIONAL C?Noucr, Rule 5.6: A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a 
partnership or_ 
employment a�ree�ent that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice 
aft�r tenrunation of the relat1onsh1p, except an agreement concerning benefits upon 
retrrement; or (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawye r's right to practice 
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that they cannot manage medical care without these devices, 
there are other methods of establishing appropriate standards 
for managing medical practice.  The best alternative is to use 
evidence-based clinical guidelines. These have the advantage of 
improving the clinical information available to the physicians, 
rather than just demanding that they reduce utilization without 
regard to how reduction is accomplished. Formal guidelines are 
also easier for physicians to contest when there is a good clinical 
reason that the patient does not fit, and they provide excellent 
evidence of standard of care in court and in administrative 
proceedings.106 
Medical licensing boards should also assure that physicians 
are in charge of patient care in the MCO. Legally, there is a 
profound difference between physician-directed care and nurs­
ing care. For example, there is  no "corporate practice of nurs­
ing" doctrine because the courts have always assumed that 
nurses will be under the direction of physicians, and that physi­
cians are subject to corporate practice bans. Another example is 
the learned intermediary doctrine for prescription drugs.107 The 
courts do not accept that NPPs are learned intermediaries. 108 
Allowing nurses without physician supervision to deliver medi­
cal care as employees of MCOs threatens the quality of care and 
allows medical care to be d elivered outside of the traditional 
regulatory system. While nurses, nurse practitioners, and physi­
cian assistants provide invaluable medical care services, if they 
are allowe d  to practice outside of physician supervision they 
may not resist pressures by their employers to compromise pa­
tient care to protect the assets of the MCOs. This does not 
mean direct supervision in most cases, but it does mean that the 
NPPs work from agreed upon practice guidelines, that physi­
cians are always available for consultation, that each nurse is 
is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties. [Official] Com­
ment: An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after 
leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom 
of clients to choose a lawyer." Edward P. Richards and Katharine C. Rathbun, Cove­
nants to not Compete: A Trap for Missouri Physicians, 94 Mo. MED. 224 (May 1997). 
106. Explicit guidelines limit overly aggressive cost-cutting strategies because, as 
public documents, they allow patients and consumer organizations to evaluate the 
care the MCO is providing. 
107. See Wyeth Lab., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688 (Miss. 1988); Swayze v. 
McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1 987); Timm v. Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 
638 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1 1 12 (1981); and Mauldin v. Upjohn Co., 697 
F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983). 
108. See Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348 (3rd Cir. 1992). 
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supervise d  by a specific physician who 
.
is limited to �upe�vi
.
si�� 
.
a 
set number of nurses, and that there ts a sy�temat1c qu.iht) Lls­
surance program in place to assure the qua
.
hty <?f th� care ren­
dered by NPPs. It also means that the medical hcen� 1� g boards 
must assure that physicians do carry out the �up.erv1s1 0n prop­erly.109 Otherwise supervision requirement� will J USt. be a sham 
that NPPs can rightfully claim only assures JOb securi ty for phy­
sicians without improving patient care. 
Regulating the activities of medical directors r�quires sepa.rat­
ing their non-medical from their medical dut�es . Phys1�1�ns 
work in many jobs that do not involve the practice of medicine 
as it is regulated by licensing laws. A physician who works as an 
executive in a health insurance company, but who does not pro­
vide medical services personally, who does not make or direct 
decisions that influence the care of individual patients and who 
does not supervise NPPs, should not be subject to license related 
sanctions110 and should not even have to hold a medical li­
cense.111 Medical licensing b oards should not attempt to be­
come consumer protection agencies for insurance issues. 
Whether the health insurance policy is fair or properly adminis­
tered is an insurance issue, and trying to use medical licensing to 
regulate it will only invite preemption by state insurance laws 
and by ERISA. Regulation should be based on whether the 
medical director is practicing medicine as defined by the state 
law, and, if so, whether the medical director is acting in a profes­
sional manner. In the Murphy case, the BOMEX found that Dr. 
Murphy's decision was inappropriate and could h ave harmed 
the patient.112 This would have been true whether Dr. Murphy 
was the medical director denying pre-certification or a treating 
physician making an incompetent decision not to operate in the 
face of substantial medical evidence that the surgery was neces-
1�. This is . �sually done through prosecutions for aiding in the unauthorized practice of med1cme. See Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W. 2d 683 (Mo. Banc 1983): 
People v. Varas, 1 1 0  A.D. 2d 646, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 577 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1985); State ex 
rel. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Hartenbach, 768 S.W. 2d 657 
·� �)�pp. E.D. 1989); People v. Gandotra, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 
. 
110. Physicians who commit crimes in this non-medical care role can have their licenses revoked, however. See State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Boyle, 924 P. 2d 1 1 13 (Colo. App. 1996) and Erickson v.  State ex rel. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs 938 P. 2d 625 (Mont. 1997). ' 
111. See Morris v. District of Columbia Bd. of Med., 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997). 
112. See Murphy, 949 P. 2d at 534. 
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sary.113 If the medical director is practicing medicine, then he/ 
she should be licensed in the state where the patient who is be­
ing treated resides. This means that nurses cannot be substi­
tuted for physicians if the medical director job requires decisions 
to be made about individual patient care, and that out-of-state 
medical directors must have a local license, or the insurer must 
reserve medical care decisions for local medical directors. 
CONCLUSION 
The police power to regulate matters that affect the health of 
the citizenry was well established in the colonies. This was not a 
dormant power, but one that was constantly exercised because 
of the epidemics that swept through the colonies. When the 
Constitution was written, this power was reserved to the states, 
and within a few years it was challenged by the yellow fever 
epidemic of 1793. As the state began to regulate medical prac­
tice and to license physicians, the courts uniformly found that 
this was an expression of the police power and granted the states 
the same broad authority to regulate medical practice that they 
already exercised in their control of other threats to the public 
health. 
In modem society, the health of the citizenry is threatened by 
a regulatory vacuum surrounding ERISA health plans. State 
medical licensing boards must step in and assure that medical 
care is delivered by properly licensed physicians, and that these 
physicians practice in an ethical manner. The police power gives 
the states great flexibility in addressing this problem through ad­
ministrative rules, license limitations and revocations, and infor­
mal sanctions. This regulation will not conflict with ERISA or 
state insurance laws as long as it is directed at the practice of 
medicine, rather than trying to substitute medical licensing 
boards for state insurance regulators. The goal of such state reg­
ulation of medical practice in MCOs is to reestablish the checks 
and balances of traditional medical practice to assure that physi­
cians respect their fiduciary duty to their patients. Good quality 
medical care and respect for patient autonomy are not incom­
patible with effective managed care, but they demand that care 
be managed ethically and not b y  simplistic economic incentives. 
113. This is not to say that BOMEX does not have the authority to regulate non­
medical practices such as over-billing, only that it is best to focus narrowly on medical 
practice when BRISA is involved. See Maun v. Department of Prof. Regulation, 701 
N.E.2d 791 (Ill. App. 4 Dist. 1998). 
